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KENTUCKY LAW JOUmNAL
JUDGMENT AFTER DEATH OF PARTY
Two parties ified a bill to quiet their title to a tract of land.
The trial resulted in judgment for the plaintiffs. At the next
term after judgment the defendants sought to secure a new trial
on the ground that one of the plaintiffs died after submission of
the cause but before judgment. The persons seeking the new
trial failed to allege ignorance of the. death at the time of judg-
ment, and failed to show that their rights were in any way pre-
judiced by it.
At common law, a judgment rendered after the death of one
of the parties was void, for "The suits shall abate by the death
of parties," III. Blackstone, 302; 2 Mod. 308; Kager v.
Vickery, 61 Kan. 342; Jefferson v. Hicks, 33 Okla. 407, 49 L. R.
A. 154. This rule was modified by statute 17 Car. II, chap. 8,
see. 1, which provided that the death of neither plaintiff nor
defendant between verdict and judgment should be assigned for
error, provided judgment should be entered within two terms
after such verdict. There have been further modifications by
later statutes, but none of these English statutes concerning this
rule were ever binding in tbis country for they were enacted
after the fourth year of the reign of James I.
The decisions of the courts of this country would be ex-
pected to closely follow the common law rule. The following
cases hold a judgment after death of a party to be void: Meyer
v. Hearst, 75 Ala. 390; Haydock v. Cobb, 5 Day (Conn.) 527;
Lockridge v. Lyon. 68 Ga. 137 (that it is a nullity); Kager v.
Vickery, 61 Kan. 342; Edwards v. Whited, 29 La. Ann. 141 (dis-
pute concerning land title, but judgment was held valid where
all the heirs of the deceased were parties, Stackhose v. Zuntz,
41 La. Ann. 102); Parker v. Home, 38 Miss. 215; Voorhis v.
Gamble, 6 Mo. App. 1 (which ignored the preceding ease of
Wittenburgk v. Wittenburgh, which held such a judgment to be
voidable only) ; Stephens v. Humphreys (death before decision-
code) 25 N. Y. Supp. 946 (see Long v. Stafford, 103 N. Y. 274,
death after verdict, post mortem judgment held good--code);
Morrison v. Deadrick, 10 Hump. (Tenn.) 342. However, these
decisions do not appear to be in accord with the opinions of the
majority of the courts of the states.
The courts which do not follow the common law rule hold
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that a decision rendered after the death of a party is voidable
only, and can only be set aside by the court rendering it where
the fact of the death does not appear in the record. Elliott v.
Patterson, 65 Cal. 109; Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Fla. 364; Danfortk
v. Danforth, 111 I. 236; Palmerton v. H~opp, 131 Ind. 23; Reid
v. Holmes, 127 Mass 236; Merrill v. Suffolk Bank, 31 Me. 57;
Hayes v. Shaw, 20 Minn. 405; Witten6urgh v. Wittenburgh, 1
Mo. App. 226; Coleman v. MacAnulty, 16 Mo. 173 (subsequent
to Voorhis v. Gamble, supra) ; McCormick v. Paddock, 20 Neb.
486; Knott v. Taylor, 99 N. C. 511; Yaple v. Titus, 41 Pa. 195;
Lynch v. Inglis, 1 Ray (S. C.) 449; Fleming v. Seeligson, 57
Tex. 524; Elliott v. Bastian, 11 Utah 452; Pugh v. Mcgue, 86
Va. 475; King v. Burdett, 28 W. Va. 601; New Orleans v. Whit-
'ney, 11 (U. S.) Sup. Ct. Rep. 422 (by entry nune pro tuna).
This appears to make such judgment binding as to the determi-
nation of the rights of the living parties unless set aside. Wood
v. Watson, 107 N. C. 52; Jefferson v. Hicks, 33 Okla. 407; Spacld
ing v. Wathen, 7 Bush 659; Deppen v. Immohr's Ex'r, 119 Ky.
413, 27 Ky. L. R. 43.
The authorities appear to be irreconcilable. "Thus accord-
ing to numerous decisions such judgments are utterly void, and
may be collaterally attacked. The decided weight of authority,
however, seems to be that if a court of general jurisdiction, or a
court which has acquired full jurisdiction over the cause and
over the parties, renders a judgment for or against a party after
his death, the judgment is not for that reason void. Such a
judgment while erroneous and voidable when properly assailed
in a direct action for that purpose, is valid until reversed by
some appropriate proceeding, and may not be collaterally at-
tacked." Encyclopedia of Pleading & Practice, vol. 11, p. 843.
See also Freeman on Judgments, vol. 1, 4th edition, see. 153,
Black on Judgments, vol. 1, see. 200.
Kentucky decisions are with the weight of authority. The
rule is based on an interpretation of see. 518, sub. 6 of the Ken-
tucky Civil Code, which provides that: "The court in which
judgment has been rendered shall have power, after the expira-
tion of the term, to vacate or modify it. ....... (6) For the
death of one of the parties before the judgment in the action."
It is reasoned that the legislature intended judgment ren-
dered after the death of one party to be voidable only, for it
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would be useless to grant the power to vacate or modify a void
judgment (Spalding v. Wathen, 7 Bush 659; Latham v. Hodges,
35 N. Ca. 267).
Such judgments are erroneous (Spencer v. Parsons, 89 Ky.
580; Sawyer, Wallace & Co.'s Admr. v. Fuqua, 41 S. W. 15, 20
K. L. R. 1; Hayden v. Ortkeiss, Admr., 83 Ky. 398), and the
proper remedy is a writ of error coram vobis (Case v. RBibelin, 1
J. J. Marsh. 29).
They cannot be collaterally attacked, for only void judg-
ments can be collaterally attacked (Prince v. Antle, 90 Ky.
138), but a voidable judgment may be effective until set aside,
(Carr v. Townsend, 63 Pa. 202), however erroneous it may be.
The party injured by the judgment may waive his right to
have it set aside. Spalding v. Wathen, 7 Bush 659.
The petition was denied for three reasons in the present
case. A judgment will not be set aside unless the party seeking
to have it set aside is injured by it. No injury was shown in
this case. The petition als f:ailed to show that the complainant
was ignorant of the death at the time judgment was rendered.
If he knew of the death at the time his action would amount to
a waiver of his right to have the judgment set aside. Then, the
petition was not accompanied by enough of the original record
to show whether the judgment should be vacated or modified.
Mosley v. Morgan, et al., 199 Ky. 848. J. W. GmLoN. JR.
